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Abstract
Economic integration has intensied international competition to attract
productive capital. This paper analyzes, both theoretically and empirically,
the e¤ect of tax policies and institutional quality on the allocation of FDI
 two aspects that the economic literature has extensively investigated,
though only in isolation. I build a simple two-country partial equilibrium
model to study competition among governments vying for potential in-
vestors whose location choices are driven by both the quality of institutions
and the corporate tax rate. Modeling good governance as a public good, it
is shown that the jurisdiction providing better institutions is able to levy
a higher tax on capital. Moreover, provided rms are sensitive enough to
institutional quality, it attracts a larger share of investment than the low-
quality/low-tax location. The main predictions of the model are tested on
FDI stocks to 63 economies using a "simple di¤erence gravity" equation
derived from discrete choice theory of rmslocation. Using a pair of des-
tination countries as the unit of analysis eliminates the need to control for
multilateral interdependence among receiving countries, a source of possi-
ble bias in the traditional gravity specication in the levels. The empirical
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evidence corroborates the claim that the sensitivity of foreign investment
to the tax rate varies signicantly between host countries characterized by
di¤erent levels of institutional quality. The ndings are robust to a num-
ber of sensitivity checks and to the use of instrumental variables to tackle
endogeneity of institutional quality and tax rates.
Keywords: foreign direct investment, scal competition, institutions,
public goods.
JEL classication: H7, F21, F23, K00.
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1. Introduction
International mobility of productive capital has increased signicantly in the past
decades. In the globalized economy, the issue of what drives international in-
vestment is becoming increasingly pressing for national governments willing to
attract multinational enterprises. Among policy makers it is commonly believed
that corporate taxation plays a paramount role in the international allocation of
investment. Hence, following the integration of capital and product markets, there
have been growing concerns that the intensied competition for mobile investment
be conducive to a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates. This process would
ultimately result in underprovision of public goods, potential distortions in rms
location decisions and an increasingly unsustainable pressure on national public
nances1. Within the European Union (EU), for instance, the slashing of tax rates
in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been repeatedly blasted by
governments of the old member States. Hence, many in the policy arena have ad-
vocated a cooperative response in the form of international tax coordination. In
fact, in the 1990s, both the OECD and the EU have proposed initiatives designed
to oppose what they regard as harmful tax competition2.
1These fears have been recently echoed by IMF Deputy Director Murilo Portugal (2007)
stating "there is equally little doubt that globalization is likely to have a substantial e¤ect on
countriesability to sustain tax revenues". It is expected that such problems of long-term scal
sustainability be exacerbated by the recent expansionary budgetary policies put in place in
response to the global economic and nancial crisis.
2Interestingly, both these initiatives envisage other measures than the harmonization of com-
pany tax rates. In particular, the EU has introduced a Code of Conduct for business taxation
(European Communities, 1998) which aims to ban discriminatory corporate tax policies, e.g.
those favoring multinational enterprises over rms considered less mobile internationally. The
parallel initiative of the OECD (1998) has the same purpose of eliminating preferential tax
Against this background, it is rather surprising that, according to the Ernst
& Young European Attractiveness Survey 2008, the tax rate on corporate income
levied by the potential destination country does not gure in the top ve most
important factors determining location choices. As a matter of fact, international
investors claim to value the most the "transparency, stability and predictability
of the political, legal and regulatory environment", together with the provision of
physical infrastructure (54% of respondents). It is not di¢ cult to nd paradig-
matic examples of the importance of market-fostering institutions on investment.
Portugal, Greece and Spain experienced an unprecedented surge in FDI inows
after joining the EU. More recently, Turkey has registered an analogous boom in
inward investment coincident with its accession negotiations to the EU3. Accord-
ing to the Wall Street Journal (2005), thanks to these o¢ cial entry negotiations
Turkey has been forced to become more similar to the EU countries in its bank-
ing sector, antitrust laws, regulation, and policies, with a positive feedback on
attracting foreign investment. In fact, major institutional reforms and constitu-
tional changes have been undertaken, including the 2003 FDI law reducing the
regulatory burden on foreign investors. Multinational companies such as Metro,
Peugeot Citro·en PSA, Vodafone PLC, and France Telecom have been increasing
their presence in Turkey, arguing that the investor protection and overall invest-
ment climate improved considerably as a result of these reforms. Overall, average
FDI ows, which were well below 1 billion USD in the 1990s, peaked to 7.7 billion
USD in the period 2000-2007.
Clearly, an important distinction has to be made between overall institutional
improvements and policies aimed at attracting FDI. Consider for instance the
case of Tanzanias recent e¤orts to lure foreign capital by implementing a pro-
gram of major liberalization policies. Although successful in attracting average
FDI inows in the period 2000-2007 more than three times as large as those in
the 1990s (415 vs. 120 million USD), such interventions have been regarded as
vastly insu¢ cient against the background of enduring scarce protection of prop-
erty rights. In fact, according to international investors, the lack of integrity in
the court and justice system still acts as a "constraint on the establishment and
protable operation of new business ventures in the country" (UNCTAD, 2002).
In this paper we propose to look at both sides of government activity in the
analysis of international business location. Our contention is that governments
regimes worldwide.
3Turkey became a candidate country to accession in 1999 and an o¢ cial accession country
on October 3, 2005.
providing good governance infrastructures have the capacity to levy higher taxes
on corporate income, and still be attractive to international investors. Thus, once
the general quality of the business environment is taken into account, the scal
variable may turn out much less relevant for investment location than commonly
thought. We formalize this idea building a simple two-country partial equilibrium
model of scal competition in which institutional quality is treated as a public
good targeted to rms. The large variable cost associated with the provision of
better institutions leads the government in the high quality jurisdiction to levy a
correspondingly high tax on corporate income. Moreover, if institutional quality
has a su¢ ciently strong impact on rmsrevenues, the low-quality/low-tax country
attracts less capital than its counterpart, in spite of the lower scal burden.
In some respects, this work adopts the same approach as in Johnson, Kauf-
mann and Shleifer (1997) as to the joint modelling of tax policies and institu-
tional infrastructure. Their main interest lies however in the interaction between
the formal and the informal sector in the transition from centrally planned to
market economies. Like them, on the other hand, we consider setting up market-
supporting institutions as having immediate implications for public nances. The
idea that institutions and policy choices like taxation are linked has been recently
developed by Besley and Persson (2009) in a political economy model of growth.
In their framework, good enforcement of contracts and property rights lead to
scal state capacity, i.e. enable countries with better institutions to tax personal
income more heavily compared to governments providing poor institutions. The
logic underlying the treatment of market-fostering institutions as a public good is
straightforward. Although not formally modelled so, this idea can be implicitly
found in Douglass Norths (1990) discussion on how formal rules and conventions
that regulate and facilitate economic transactions have emerged and evolved in
historical perspective. His rather broad and abstract view of institutions as "a
set of economic rules of the game (with enforcement)" can be immediately given
more shape in the light of what constitutes a public good. Easily interpretable
laws as well as e¤ective judicial systems and e¢ cient courts are necessary ele-
ments to ensure enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights, which
are commonly used as paradigmatic examples of good governance. Similarly, in
a less narrow interpretation, non byzantine regulations governing the function-
ing of nancial, labor and product markets, together with a well functioning and
competent bureaucracy to implement them, can be regarded as essential aspects
enhancing the quality of the economic environment.
The relationship between public good provision and scal competition has re-
cently received renewed attention in the theoretical literature. In particular, in
contrast to the traditional public nance view of identical preferences and tech-
nologies, several papers have focused on the interaction between public good pro-
vision and tax competition highlighting the e¤ects of rmsheterogeneity4. Such
heterogeneity in the use of the public input allows competing jurisdictions to dif-
ferentiate endogenously with respect to the provision of public services (Zissimos
and Wooders, 2008). In doing so, countries can avoid wasteful tax competition,
i.e. the result of "race to the bottom" in corporate tax rates found in the tradi-
tional literature on scal competition (Oates, 1972). In treating institutions as a
public good we follow this strand of the literature, adopting a richer modelling
strategy that applies discrete choice theory to rm location decisions (Coughlin
et. al, 1991; Guimaraes et al., 2003).
On the other hand, the relationship between institutions and capital ows has
been so far considered mainly an empirical research question. In fact, institutional
underdevelopment has been found a determining factor in explaining the Lucas
paradox of why capital does not ow from rich to poor countries (Papaioannou,
2009). Analyzing aggregate ows over the period 1970-2000, Alfaro, Kalemli-
Ozcan and Volosovych (2008) identify a causal e¤ect of institutional quality on
the direction of such ows. Their results are robust to the inclusion of other
possible determinants, such as the level of development and human capital in the
recipient country. Other contributions have focussed more narrowly on FDI ows
only (Daude and Stein, 2007; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). Since FDI is a very
large share of capital formation in poor countries, the FDI-promoting e¤ect of
good institutions might be an important channel of their overall e¤ect on growth
and development (IMF, 2003).
The empirical literature has also dealt extensively with the e¤ects of taxa-
tion on international investment using di¤erent methodologies (see for instance
Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Razin and Sadka, 2008). De Mooij and Ederveen
(2003) provide a meta-analysis of the main results found in this strand of the
literature. None of these contributions, however, has considered the joint e¤ect
of taxes and institutional quality on foreign investment. The aim of the empiri-
cal part of this paper is indeed to ll this gap5. Somewhat more related to our
4The e¤ect of heterogeneity in the context of the provision of public goods is not a new issue;
in fact, diversity in tastes for the public good drives the results of e¢ cient sorting of consumers
across jurisdictions in Tiebout (1956) models.
5Recently, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) have investigated empirically the e¤ects of taxation
and institutions on foreign investment choices by US investors. The focus of their analysis is
analysis is the paper by Mutti and Grubert (2004) investigating empirical asym-
metries in the e¤ect of taxation on foreign operations by US multinationals. In
their econometric analysis, the authors nd that investment into developing coun-
tries is signicantly more responsive to corporate taxation compared to investment
into advanced economies. The reasons behind this result are left unexplained how-
ever, since the proposed explanations, based on higher provision of physical public
goods and infrastructures characterizing developed countries, turn out not to be
borne by the data. As those countries have overall a better governance infrastruc-
ture, the framework of this paper provides a theoretically founded rationale to the
observed pattern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of scal competition with institutional quality provided as a public good.
In section 3 we derive the empirical model and describe the data used in the
analysis. The regression results, together with robustness checks and instrumental
variables estimates, are discussed in Section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. Taxation and the quality of institutions: a theoretical
framework
This section describes the economic environment and analyzes the non-cooperative
game between two policy-makers setting corporate tax rates while institutional
quality is provided as a public good to attract productive capital. Competition
among jurisdictions is modelled as a non-cooperative stage game in which govern-
ments sequentially choose institutional quality (Stage 1 and Stage 2). In Stage 3,
having observed the levels of institutional quality, they set simultaneously their
tax rates. Finally, after policy choices have been made, rms take tax rates and
institutional quality as given and locate in the jurisdiction where prots are max-
imized.
The choice on institutional quality is a long term policy objective, whereas tax
rates can be readily adjusted in the short run. These features are captured in-
deed by hypothesizing commitment on the level of institutional quality. Moreover,
modelling the choice on quality as Stackelberg game reects important di¤erences
among countries, which in turn a¤ect their capabilities to compete for mobile
the composition of outbound capital ows, however. In particular, they ask whether direct
investment to low-tax countries is penalized by the worldwide tax regime employed by the U.S.,
whereas weak investor protection in foreign countries may in principle increase the value of
control, creating an incentive to use FDI rather than portfolio investment.
capital on the international stage. One could naturally think of a general frame-
work where a developed country (or an old EU member State) competes with a
developing economy (a new member State in Central and Eastern Europe). The
subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by backward induction.
Firms
In the economy there is a set of rms of measure N . Each rm can invest only in
one of the two competing jurisdictions, and cannot set up multiple subsidiaries.
Moreover, each producer is able to sell a single unit of its product locally, and
does not export6. When locating in country j, prots to rm i are as follows:
ij = p  wj    j + iaj + "ij (1)
The prot function of the investor follows the modelling strategy of Wood-
ers and Zissimos (2008), but, in addition to the deterministic component, is also
composed of a stochastic part. In equation 1, p is the product price, while wj is
the per-unit production cost. Throughout, we will assume that wj is equalized
across countries, and xed at level w. Moreover, in order to focus on the location
decision, the mark-up over production costs, p   w, is assumed su¢ ciently high
to ensure that the rm makes positive prots. When producing in country j, rm
i pays taxes at a rate  j; the tax can be thought of as a lump sum tax or a sales
tax (since each rm produces and sells only a single unit of the good). The e¤ect
of institutions on prots is captured by the term iaj, where aj is the level of
institutional quality in country j and i is a strictly positive parameter reecting
the importance of quality for rm i. The idea behind this formulation is very sim-
ple and intuitive: providing market-fostering institutions (e.g. a well functioning
bureaucracy, e¤ective protection of property rights, etc.) is equivalent to granting
a subsidy to the rms. Stated from the opposite perspective, by increasing the
cost of doing business, poor institutions impose an additional implicit burden on
producers compared to a high quality business environment7. Following a recent
literature on trade and institutions, i can be thought of expressing important
6This restriction is consistent with MNEs investing abroad to service local markets, a pattern
which has been found in the data. For example, Braconier et al. (2005) document that 56% of
total sales of US multinationals are local sales.
7In the international trade literature, Anderson and Young (1999) develop a model in which,
under risk neutrality, imperfect contract enforcement in the importing country turns out equiv-
alent to a tari¤. More intuitively, corruption can be considered as a paradigmatic example of
poor institutional quality associated with an explicit and quantiable cost to rms, i.e. bribe
technological di¤erences among rms (and sectors), with institutionally depen-
dent industries being characterized by larger i. This source of heterogeneity
would have important implications for the sectoral composition of inward invest-
ment in the two countries8. However, also with a view to the empirical tests, here
we choose to look only at the aggregate measure of inward investment. Conse-
quently, we take i to be a constant imposing the normalization i = . This
assumption is not too restrictive once one recalls that in this context institutional
quality should be considered as a composite measure of overall good governance;
as such, it should not be identied only with protection of property rights and
enforcement of contracts, whose relevance can markedly di¤er across sectors.
Finally, following Coughlin et al. (1991), the random component of the prot
function is modelled as an additive term, "ij, denoting the unobservable unique
prot advantages to rm i from investing in country j. The stochastic term is
identically and independently distributed across rms and locations following a
double exponential (Type I extreme value) distribution. The cumulative distrib-
ution takes therefore the form F(x) = exp(  exp ( x=)), with  the (positive)
scale parameter. The variance is equal to 22=6, and the mean is zero. Hence,
 is proportional to the variance of the distribution of the stochastic term. As
such, the scale parameter captures rmsheterogeneity with respect to the gains
associated with choosing a specic location.
Firms are not strategic. They take institutional quality and taxes in each
country as given and locate in the jurisdiction where their net prots are higher.
payments. Successful e¤orts to control and ght corruption ght would therefore immediately
reduce rms costs. See Wei (2000) for a rst quantitative analysis of the e¤ect of corrup-
tion on OECD international investors and Hakkala et al. (2008) for an assessment on Swedish
multinational rms.
8Recent contributions have analyzed the impact of institutions, namely protection of property
rights and contract enforcement, on international trade. Building on the literature of incomplete
contracts, Levchenko (2007) proposes a two-country model in which institutional di¤erences -
exogenously assumed - are an important source of comparative advantage. He also nds evidence
of the "institutional content of trade", i.e. institutional di¤erences are an important determinant
of the composition of trade ows. Similarly, Nunn (2007) investigates the impact of contract
enforcement on the pattern of trade focusing on one specic transmission channel through which
institutions a¤ect comparative advantage: under-investment in relationship-specic investments.
Berkowitz et al. (2006) argue that good institutions exporting countries can enhance interna-
tional trade, particularly trade in complex products, i.e. products that are highly di¤erentiated
and whose characteristics are di¢ cult to fully specify in contracts. Thus, as for those products
contracts will be more incomplete than for simple products, countries with better institutions
will have a comparative advantage in producing such goods. It is found that this production
cost channel is stronger than the international transaction cost channel.
In a two-jurisdiction setting, the probability of rm i locating in country 1 against
country 2 is therefore given by:
si1 = prob(i1  i2)
= prob(("i2   "i1  E (i1)  E (i2))
= prob("  E (i1)  E (i2))
where E(i1) has been dened as the non-stochastic component of the prot func-
tion, or the expected prots; and " is set equal to the di¤erence "i2   "i1. Given
the distributional assumptions on the individual "ijs, " will follow a logistic distri-
bution. Therefore, using the result in McFadden (1974), the choice probabilities
are binomial logit9. With this in mind, the expected measure of rms locating in
country 1 and 2 is, respectively:
X1 = N

exp [(a1    1) =]
exp [(a1    1) =] + exp [(a2    2) =]

| {z }
s1
(2)
X2 = N

exp [(a2    2) =]
exp [(a1    1) =] + exp [(a2    2) =]

| {z }
s2
(3)
Equations 2 and 3 show the advantages of the hypothesized distributional as-
sumptions. The logit choice probabilities (sj, in the parentheses) assume indeed
a closed form solution and are readily interpretable. The e¤ect of rmshetero-
geneity emerges clearly. When  ! 1, and consequently the variance of the
stochastic term tends to innity, the variables a¤ecting rmsprots have no pre-
dictive power: the two alternative locations have the same probability of being
chosen by the investors. For ! 0, on the other hand, all the relevant information
driving location is in the non stochastic part of the prot function. The choice
model is therefore deterministic, with s1 = 1 if E(1) E(2) > 0, and s1 = 0
otherwise.
9Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992, p.40) note that, when only two alternatives are
considered, other distributions satisfy the property of generating a logistic distribution in the
di¤erence. However, if the choice set is enlarged, the double exponential is both a su¢ cient and
a necessary condition to generate multinomial choice probabilities.
Governments
Revenues to governments are given by the taxes levied on the capital employed
within their borders. Like any other public goods, the institutional infrastructure
is supplied at a cost. The total cost of providing institutional quality aj has two
components: i) a xed quality-dependent cost C (aj); ii) a cost proportional both
to the expected measure of rms locating in the jurisdiction and to the quality
level, ajXj10.  is the cost parameter, and it is assumed 0 <  < 111.
Rents to governments are thus given by tax revenues net of the cost of providing
institutional quality. The functions to be maximized take the form:
Rj = ( j   aj)Xj   C (aj) (4)
2.1. Tax rates
At Stage 3, governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively set their tax rates
taking the quality levels of their institutions as given12. As shown by Anderson,
De Palma and Thisse (1992), functions like 4 are strictly quasi-concave, so that
the rst order conditions characterize best responses. The existence of a unique
equilibrium in taxes is guaranteed by the result in Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991).
The maximization exercise gives:
@Rj
@ j
= Xj +
@Xj
@ j
 j   aj @Xj
@ j
=
= Xj   1

Xj (1  sj) ( j   aj) = 0:
10As an example, consider the quality of the bureaucracy. This formulation of the cost function
implies that a xed cost, dependent on the quality level, has to be paid to set up the bureaucratic
structure of the country. In addition, a variable cost, still proportional to quality, is incurred
for its functioning (e.g. salary of the civil servants). The proportionality with respect to the
number of rms follows from the fact that, absent consumers from the model, the public good
is interely targeted to the productive sector.
11A further restriction which will be imposed for the derivation of the SPNE for the full game
is that  < . The reason for this assumption will be made clear once the comparative statics
results are derived and discussed.
12Appendix A illustrates an extension where the e¤ects of agglomeration economies on the
scal competititon outcome are analyzed.
The system of FOCs is non-linear in the tax rates. Then, the equilibrium  j is
implicitly given by:
 j =

(1  sj) + aj: (5)
From this, it is possible to calculate the slope of the best response function of
country j with respect to the tax rate of the competing jurisdiction (labelled  j).
Applying the implicit function theorem one obtains:
@ j
@ j
=   @
2Rj/ @ j@ j
@2Rj/ @ 2j
=
sjs j
1  s j > 0:
Thus, given the level of institutional quality, tax rates are strategic complements.
This property is in accordance with the traditional models of scal competition;
in such framework, strategic complementarity is indeed the driving force behind
the "race to the bottom" in corporate tax rates.
Before analyzing the e¤ect of quality on tax rates, we rst characterize the sym-
metric equilibrium in which both countries provide the same level of institutional
quality. Suppose a1 = a2. Thus, from equation 5 it follows that  1 =  2. Clearly,
as the two jurisdictions are perfectly symmetric, in this case X1 = X2 = N/ 2.
Therefore, when countries do not di¤er in the quality of their institutions, they
also set equal taxes; as a result, rms split equally among the two locations.
Proposition 1. When institutional quality is the same, countries set equal taxes
and producers split equally among the two jurisdictions.
Given the assumed symmetry between countries, only quality di¤erentiation
can drive diversity in tax rates and consequently shift business location. Moreover,
in this framework, taxes are not driven to zero, for two reasons. First, there is
the parameter , which is proportional to the variance of the stochastic term in
the prot function. As long as  > 0, there is a positive contribution of rms
heterogeneity to the tax rate. In other words, governments can tax away part
of the rents from which producers benet thanks to their unobservable location
advantages. In addition to that, there is the vertical component related to the
qualitative dimension. Here the tax rate depends positively on the quality of
institutions because providing better governance infrastructure implies a larger
variable cost that calls for nancing through higher tax rates.
Comparative statics
How do changes in quality a¤ect the equilibrium? To answer this question, start
from the symmetric situation and suppose that a1 increases, while a2 is kept
constant. The e¤ect on equilibrium taxes can be found by totally di¤erentiating
equation 5 (the full computations can be found in Appendix C). Dene 1 
X1=X2, as the ratio of the expected number of rms investing in country 1 over
those locating in 2. Then, it holds that:
d 1
da1
=
 + 1 + 
2
1
1 + 1 + 21
> 0 (6)
Hence, the provision of higher institutional quality results in a higher tax on
capital. To quantify the relative magnitude of such increase, recall rst that
 < 1. Then, a su¢ cient condition for d 1/ da1 < 1 is that  < 1. Intuitively, the
impact of institutional quality on prots does not have to be too large in order
for the tax rate to increase less than proportionately with institutional quality.
If this is the case, in other words, an increase in institutional quality is not fully
transmitted into higher taxes.
The e¤ect of the quality increase on the tax levied by the competing jurisdiction
is found by taking the total di¤erential of the FOC for country 2, which gives:
d 2
da1
=
   
1 + 1 + 21
: (7)
The sign of the di¤erential crucially depends on the relative size of the parameters
 and . In particular, the equilibrium tax rate decreases in the institutional
quality of the competing country if and only if  < . Before commenting on
this, we rst derive the total e¤ect of an improvement in institutional quality in
country 1 on investor location choices, as follows:
d1
da1
=
@1
@a1
+
@1
@ 1
d 1
da1
:
Recalling the denition of 1, it can be easily checked that, at the equilibrium,
the following equality holds 1 = exp [( 2    1 +  (a1   a2))/]. Hence, the dif-
ferential is as follows:
d1
da1
= exp [( 2    1 +  (a1   a2))/]
1

d ( 2    1 +  (a1   a2))
da1
= (8)
= 1
1


d 2
da1
  d

1
da1
+ 

=
= 1
1


1 (   )
1 + 1 + 21

:
where the third line uses the di¤erentials derived in 6 and 7. Again, a su¢ cient
and necessary condition for d1/ da1 > 0 is that  < . Once more, the sensitivity
of rmsprots to the institutional quality variable is crucial; in particular, this
sensitivity has to be higher than the variable cost parameter associated with the
provision of institutional quality. If this is the case, then, at equilibrium, the low
quality jurisdiction has to lower its tax rate as a response to better institutions
in the competing country. Moreover, the e¤ect on prots is su¢ ciently high to
lead more rms to locate in the high quality country, notwithstanding higher
corporate taxation. The opposite is true when  > . In this case, it holds
that d 2=da1 > 0. However, due to higher variable costs associated with better
institutions, taxes increase more in country 1, or d 1=da1 > d 2=da1. Thus, it
is d1=da1 < 0. Notice that the logit formulation implies that a countrys gain
comes to the detriment of the competitor. In other words, as the total number of
investors is xed, rms simply reshu­ e between locations when relevant decision
variables change (Schmidheiny and Brülhart, 2009).
Proposition 2. Assume  < : Then in the case of asymmetric institutional
quality, the country providing better institutions levies a higher tax and attracts
more rms than the country with low quality institutions.
2.2. Quality of institutions
This section describes and solves the Stackelberg sub-game in which governments
set the quality of their institutions13. Institutional quality is modelled as a discrete
variable, which can assume two values: aH and aL, for high and low quality,
respectively. Recall from Section 2 that government revenues to be maximized
are:
Rj = ( j   aj)Xj   C (aj)
13Appendix B provides an extension of the game dealing with the particular arrangement of
subsidized institutional quality.
where ajXj +C (aj) is the total cost associated with institutional quality provi-
sion. We assume throughout that  < , where  is a parameter measuring the
sensitivity of rmsprots to institutional quality. Recalling the comparative sta-
tics results in Section 2, it is indeed easy to see that without this restriction there
would be no incentives for governments to invest in high institutional quality.
The followers problem
At stage 2 the follower observes the quality choice made by country 1 and set its
best response choosing the quality level that yields the highest net revenues. Let
R2
 
aH ; aL

be the rents to the government of country 2 when they choose a low
quality level, aL, whereas country 1 has chosen a high quality aH . In order to
reduce the burden of notation in the analysis of the di¤erent cases, dene  as
the ratio between the mass of rms locating in the high-quality country and the
measure of producers in the low-quality jurisdiction. Hence, by denition, using
the result in Proposition 2, it always holds that  > 1. The payo¤ functions to
country 2 are as follows:
R2
 
aH ; aH

= N   C  aH
R2
 
aH ; aL

=  1

N   C  aL
R2
 
aL; aH

= N   C  aH
R2
 
aL; aL

= N   C  aL
Let C (a) be the incremental xed cost of quality, C (a)  C  aH  
C
 
aL

> 0. The best responses for the follower, r
 
qk

, k = H;L, are then:
r
 
aH

=

aH
aL
if
if
C (a) < 
 
1  1


N
C (a) > 
 
1  1


N
and
r
 
aL

=

aH
aL
if
if
C (a) <  (   1)N
C (a) >  (   1)N :
The leaders problem
At the rst stage of the game, country 1 takes government 2s sub-game perfect
strategy as given and chooses the institutional quality that grants the highest
rents. As the best response of the follower depends on the incremental cost of
quality, C (a), so does the strategy of the leading country. In particular, one
can distinguish three di¤erent scenarios depending on the magnitude of C (a).
Since (   1) >  1  1


, these are:
Case i). Low incremental cost of quality: C (a) < 
 
1  1


N:
In this case the lagging country will always choose a high quality level. It is
easy to check that for the leading jurisdiction it holds R1
 
aH ; aH

> R1
 
aL; aH

.
Hence, it will also choose a high quality.
Case ii). Intermediate incremental cost of quality: 
 
1  1


N < C (a) <
 (   1)N .
In this cost range the lagging country always chooses to di¤erentiate its qual-
ity provision from that of the competing jurisdiction. Therefore, this latter has
to compare R1
 
aH ; aL

with R1
 
aL; aH

. It can be veried that R1
 
aH ; aL

>
(<)R1
 
aL; aH

when C (a) < (>)
 
   1


N . Since
 
   1


> (   1), coun-
try 1 will always set a high quality.
Case iii). High incremental cost of quality: C (a) >  (   1)N .
In this cost range the lagging country will always set a low quality. It is easy
to see that R1
 
aH ; aL

> R1
 
aL; aL

.
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
The magnitude of the xed cost of quality gives rise to three possible equilib-
ria. Taking into account equilibrium taxes derived in Section 3, they are fully
characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The subgame perfect equilibrium is as follows:
 For low incremental cost,C (a) <   1  1


N , both countries provide high
institutional quality ("race to the top"). Equilibrium taxes are  1j(H;H) =
 2j(H;H) = 2+ aH .
 For intermediate incremental cost,   1  1


N < C (a) <  (   1)N ,
there is quality di¤erentiation, with the leading country setting high quality
("rst mover advantage"). Equilibrium taxes are  1j(H;L) =  (1 + ) +aH
and  2j(H;L) =  (1 +  1) + aL.
 For high incremental cost, C (a) >  (   1)N , both countries provide low
quality ("race to the bottom"). Equilibrium taxes are  1j(L;L) =  2j(L;L) =
2+ aL.
Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria are possible. The type of equi-
librium depends on the xed cost di¤erential of setting high vs. low quality
institutions. Symmetric equilibria are realized at the extremes of the cost range.
In such cases, if the incremental cost if quality is low (high) both jurisdictions set
high (low) institutional quality; as a result, they levy the same tax on capital.
Due to the costs associated with institutional quality, rents to governments are
clearly higher in the symmetric equilibrium with low quality institutions. When
the cost di¤erential is intermediate, there is an asymmetric equilibrium, with
the developed country having a rst mover advantage. Since it sets high quality
institutions, it can levy a higher tax than its competitor,  1j(H;L) >  2j(H;L). Con-
sequently, it attracts a larger share of rms and realizes higher rents, R1
 
aH ; aL

> R2
 
aH ; aL

.
Finally, using the FOC in 5, it is possible to compare the implicit equilibrium
taxes in all the alternative cases corresponding to di¤erent levels of institutional
quality. Hence, one gets the following inequality:
 2j(H;L) <  i j(L;L) <  i j(H;H) <  1j(H;L) ,
where  1j(H;L) is dened as the implicit tax rate in country 1 in the asymmetric
equilibrium in which country 1 is high quality and country 2 is low quality. As
expected, taxes are always higher in the jurisdiction(s) providing high institutional
quality compared to alternative low quality locations ( i j(L;L) <  i j(H;H) and
 2j(H;L) <  1j(H;L)). In the asymmetric equilibrium, however, there is also a
strategic e¤ect at work. The tax rate in the high (low) quality is higher (lower)
than the corresponding tax rate in the symmetric equilibrium ( 1j(H;L) >  i j(H;H)
and  2j(H;L) <  i j(L;L)).
Overall, the results say that countries with a better business environment are
characterized by higher taxes compared to low-quality jurisdictions; notwithstand-
ing the higher scal burden on corporate income, if the e¤ect of market-fostering
institutions on rmsprots is large enough, they are able attract a higher share
of rms. Finally, as discussed above, in the asymmetric equilibrium net revenues
from corporate taxation are larger in the high quality country.
3. Empirical evidence
The stripped-down two-country model described in the previous sections illus-
trates the consequences of scal competition when institutional quality is taken
into account and considered as a public good having a cost reducing e¤ect on
rmsprots. First of all, a high level of institutional quality is always coupled
with high corporate taxes. Secondly, if the sensitivity of rms to the institutional
variable is su¢ ciently high, the country providing better institutions attracts more
productive capital than its low-tax/low-quality competitor. This nding suggests
that the responsiveness of foreign investment to the scal variable does change
across countries characterized by di¤erent levels of institutional quality. The aim
of the empirical exercise is to test this prediction, thus highlighting the importance
of considering both sides of government action when analyzing corporate location
choices.
To obtain a model that can be taken to the data the baseline framework
described above needs to be modied and enriched to account for a plurality of
investing and recipient countries, as well as for other decision variables relevant
for the choice of investment allocation. To this purpose, we adapt the modelling
strategy used by Head and Ries (2008) to analyze cross-border M&As. In the
economy there are N investing rms, with Nc being the number of investors in
country c. Let J be the number of host countries. Given the enlarged choice set,
the probability for a rm from country c to invest in country j is given by the
multinomial logit formula14:
scj =
exp(Acj)P
l exp(Acl)
(9)
where Acj is the non-stochastic part of the prot function, which includes only
characteristics a¤ecting prots that are specic to the host country (e.g institu-
tional quality and corporate tax rates) and to the dyad cj. Consistently with the
ndings of the empirical literature on FDI, we include in Acj an additional cost
component summarizing transaction and information costs related to the invest-
ment in country j. Such costs are captured by several measures of dissimilarity
between investing and recipient country, as well as by their geographical distance.
Dene Kj as the total stock of assets in country j that are available to foreign
investors15; moreover, let nc  Nc=N be the fraction of rms in country c. The
14In this specication the variance of the stochastic component in the prot function has been
normalized with respect to the parameter . Such normalization is equivalent to normalizing
the scale of the prots that generate the logit choice probabilities. Clearly, it has no e¤ects on
the relative ordering of choices. On this point, see Train (2003, ch. 3).
15The assumption of a xed capital stock in the host country is fully consistent with FDI
taking place through M&As, which entail essentially a change in the ownership structure of
expected bilateral stock of assets in country j owned by investors from c is then:
E [FDIcj] = ncscjKj: (10)
Substituting 9 into 10, expected bilateral stocks can be expressed as16:
E [FDIcj] = nc
exp(Acj)P
l exp(Acl)
Kj (11)
In order to move from the expected values E [FDIcj] to the bilateral stocks
actually observed, dene cj  FDIcj/E[FDIcj] as the ratio of actual to observed
bilateral FDI stocks. It holds that E

cj

= 1. Equation 11 becomes then:
FDIcj = E [FDIcj] cj = nc
exp(Acj)P
l exp(Acl)
Kjcj (12)
After imposing Bcl 
P
l exp(Acl), 12 becomes further:
FDIcj = nc exp(Acj)B
 1
cl Kjcj (13)
This expression has many resemblances with the multiplicative gravity equa-
tion derived in the international trade literature (Anderson, 1979). In a similar
way, the FDI stock from country c to country j is determined by all the variables
a¤ecting rmsprotability. Moreover, there is a positive relationship with both
the size of the investing economy (proxied by the share of investors nc) and the size
of the receiving country (measured by the value of assets, Kj). Bcl is a measure
of the potential competition faced by country j in attracting the investment of
country c. Indeed, note that it depends negatively on the taxes levied in all other
recipient countries, as well as on the measures of bilateral distance between those
countries and the investor. As such, it resembles the multilateral resistance terms
proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) for international trade ows. In
that context, those terms capture the fact that bilateral trade ows do not only
depend on bilateral trade barriers but also on trade barriers across all trading
existing assets. It can be reconciled with de-novo entry by assuming divestitures or depreciation
of assets.
16The model is static in nature and therefore does not specify the sequence of FDI ows
which would lead to the expected stock. Modelling such ows would require taking into account
also divestitures of assets (i.e. negative ows) as well as adjustment costs associated with the
transition to the desired FDI levels.
partners. Similarly, in our case, the term Bcl implies, speaking loosely, that bi-
lateral predictions concerning FDI stocks do not readily extend to a multilateral
world because of complex indirect interactions linking all the investing and recip-
ient economies. Such interdependence has to be somehow controlled for in the
gravity equation to obtain consistent estimates. Several studies aim at doing so
by including origin- and destination-specic xed e¤ects (Head and Ries, 2008;
Coeurdacier et al. 2009). Alternatively, ad hoc remoteness indices have been
introduced (Alfaro et al., 2008), even if there is no theoretical foundation to such
approach (Head, 2003)17. The problem can be tackled in a di¤erent way. Con-
sider country cs investment in country m, which can be derived from equation
13, mutatis mutandis:
FDIim = nc exp(Acm)B
 1
cmKmcm (14)
Taking the ratio of 13 to 14, and noting that Bcj = Bcm, one gets:
FDIcj
FDIcm
=
exp(Acj)Kj
exp(Acm)Km
cjm: (15)
where cjm  cj=cm: Hence, considering relative FDI stocks originating from
the same investor eliminates the multilateral term, as those stocks depend only
on the relevant bilateral variables. This pattern of substitution among alterna-
tives is known as the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property.
That is, in the logit model, the relative odds of choosing country j over m are
the same no matter what the other alternative locations, or their attributes, are
(Train, 2003). In general, the IIA property is rather restrictive, and, as such,
unlikely to hold across all the possible destination country pairs. Nonetheless,
more restrictions can be introduced in order to make it an appropriate represen-
tation of MNEsforeign investment choices. Specically, the estimating strategy
depends on choosing dyads of receiving countries that belong to the same regional
trade agreement. There is a twofold rationale for this choice. Firstly, it entails
considering only country pairs located in the same geographical area, recogniz-
ing that physical proximity makes di¤erent locations more comparable as to the
relative scal cost to foreign investors. In other words, we explicitly take into ac-
count the well-known fact that scal competition for mobile capital has a strong
local dimension (on this point see for instance Crabbe and Vandenbussche, 2008).
17Such "distantness" indices are constructed as GDP-weighted average distances. In the
context of international capital ows, using GDP as a proxy for nancial development, they
would ideally capture nancial remoteness.
Secondly, by a similar reasoning, it features the pattern of close substitutability
for multinational rms among recipient countries linked by tari¤-reducing agree-
ments. This is true both for investment aimed at servicing local demand in a
certain area and for export-platform FDI, as the same tari¤ barriers will be faced
in foreign markets (Ekholm at al., 2007). Restricting the number of country pairs
in this way is consistent with a nested logit approach, in which location decisions
are taken on a partitioned set of alternatives18. Using this criterion leads to a
total of 452 pairs of destination countries.
Taking logs of both sides of 15 yields an equation that can be estimated us-
ing linear regression techniques. Several papers in international trade have re-
cently used similar approaches based on di¤erence gravity equations. Anderson
and Marcoullier (2002) have proposed a gravity model in di¤erences with respect
to a base country to analyze the e¤ect of insecurity on the patterns of trade
ows. The bilateral di¤erencing technique among exporting countries is adopted
by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2009) in order to quantify the impact of time
delays on trade ows. Hanson and Xiang (2004) focus on how the home-market
e¤ect vary with industry characteristics using both bilateral di¤erencing and a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence gravity specications.
3.1. Specication and variables
The basic log-linearized simple di¤erence gravity equation to be estimated looks
like:
ln

FDIcj
FDIcm

=  + 0 ln

GDPj
GDPm

+ 1 ln

distcj
distcm

+ (Dcj  Dcm)  +(16)
1 (taxj   taxm) + 2 (Ij   Im) + "cjm
The dependent variable is given by the value of FDI stocks from country c to
country j relative to the stock from the same country to m. The e¤ect of the
relative size of the host countries is captured by the log-ratio of their GDPs.
In keeping with the standard gravity literature, other controls include variables
summarizing transaction and information costs commonly found to impede foreign
18Assuming a particular structure of correlation for the random terms, in a nested logit model
the set of alternatives can be partitioned into subsets in such a way that the IIA property holds
within each nest but, in general, not across nests (Train, 2003). This approach is adopted by
Head and Mayer (2004) to analyze the e¤ect of "market potential" on the location decisions of
Japanese multinationals into the European Union. The estimation of a nested logit is required
as they observe variables relevant for protability both at the national and at the regional levels.
investment. Hence, ln (distcj/distcm) is the log-ratio of the geographical distance
between the investor and the recipients; (Dcj  Dcm) is the vector di¤erence of two
dummies, whose components take the value of 1 if the investor and the relevant
destination country share a common language and have been linked by colonial
ties in the past19.
The main interest lies in the coe¢ cients 1 and 2. The e¤ect of the scal
cost is captured by the di¤erential (taxj   taxm). If taxes do matter in the alloca-
tion of foreign investment, then countries associated with higher corporate taxes
should receive lower relative inward investment, keeping all other determinants
constant. Thus, the semi-elasticity of the tax di¤erential should be negative, or
1 < 0. (Ij   Im) measures the di¤erence in institutional quality in the two host
countries. Ceteris paribus, economies with better institutions attract more foreign
investment; hence, it should be 2 > 0.
The main prediction from the theoretical model sketched above is that the
responsiveness of FDI to taxation should change with the level of institutional
quality. In order to test this, rst of all, we di¤erentiate countries with respect to
the quality of their institutions. Specically, we select as high quality countries
those economies for which the measure of institutional quality is in the top three
deciles of the distribution of this indicator. The remaining countries are treated
as low quality20. We choose the threshold to be not too restrictive in order to
retain su¢ cient variability of the quality variable among the high-quality coun-
tries. Moreover, inspection of the distribution shows that the variable "jumps" in
correspondance with the chosen cuto¤ (see table E-4 in Appendix E).
Consequently, based on the institutional level associated with the host country
pairs, we can di¤erentiate among three occurrences: two symmetric cases, where
countries j and m are both high quality or both low quality destinations, and
one asymmetric group. In this latter case, we construct the dependent variable
(and, hence, the controls) taking the high quality economy as the numerator
country j and the low quality host as the denominator country m21. Moreover,
to capture how institutional quality a¤ects the relationship between FDI and
corporate taxation we include in the estimating equation a (demeaned) interaction
19Hence, the di¤erence is equal to one (negative one) if the associated dummy in the numerator
country is one (zero) and the associated dummy in the denominator country is zero (one), and
zero otherwise.
20The high quality countries are: Japan, France, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Australia, United
States, Germany, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Austria, Singapore, Denmark, Swe-
den, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.
21Clearly, each country pair enters only once in the estimation.
term as follows:
ln

FDIcj
FDIcm

=  + 0 ln

GDPj
GDPm

+ 1 ln

distcj
distcm

+ (Dcj  Dcm)  + (17)
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Thus, we estimate equation 17 separately on the three sub-samples. Following
the theoretical predictions, the allocation of FDI to high quality countries should
be less sensitive to (relative) tax rates compared to the low quality host countries.
Hence, the coe¢ cient estimate of 1 is expected lower in absolute value in the high
quality sub-sample than in the low quality sub-sample. In addition, a positive
coe¢ cient on the interaction term implies that the negative e¤ect of taxation on
FDI is less strong for country characterized by a high level of institutional quality.
3.2. Data
This section discusses briey the main data used in the analysis. The analysis is
cross-sectional for a number of reasons mainly related to the nature and availability
of data22. A detailed description of all the data and sources is found in Table E-2
in Appendix E. FDI is measured as the average stock of FDI in a sample of 63
destination economies from 17 OECD countries over the 2003-2005 period. Data
are drawn from the OECD reports.
Quality of institutions
Measures on the quality of institutions are taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2007). The authors constructed several composite indicators applying
an unobserved components methodology to survey data and expert polls (for 2007
there were 33 data sources). The surveys are conducted with biannual frequency,
1996 being the rst year in which data are available. To construct our institutional
quality variable we consider only those indicators that are more consistent with
the suggested interpretation of institutions as a public good. Specically, they
are:
22The explanatory power of the model comes purely from the cross-section, which is sensible
given the focus on capital stocks and the fact that the independent variables of interest - taxation
and institutions - are mostly changing little over time. Using the cross-section, moreover, makes
it possible to maximize the number of countries for which measures of e¤ective tax rates are
available.
 Rule of law: measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have con-
dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as
the likelihood of crime and violence.
 Government e¤ectiveness: measuring perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementa-
tion, and the credibility of the governments commitment to such policies.
Consistently with the theoretical approach, we are interested in the overall
e¤ect of institutional quality on foreign investment, and we will not try to iso-
late the di¤erent channels through which institutions a¤ect economic outcomes
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Therefore, we build the variable for institutional
quality by averaging the two indices above, and assigning them equal weight.
In order to smooth out the e¤ects of potential measurement error, we use the
three-period average over the years 1996-200023. We rescale the indicator, that
originally ranges between -2.5 and +2.5, as to vary on a 0 - 1 scale; in all cases, a
higher score is indicative of better institutions.
Tax rates
Two di¤erent measures of the tax burden on corporations are employed in the
analysis. First, we use the statutory tax rates. This is indeed the most immediate
and readily available measure of the scal burden24. However, a possible short-
coming of statutory tax rates when analyzing a cross-section of countries is that
23Employing lagged values of the institutional variable helps somewhat to reduce possible
problems of simultaneity with FDI. As Daude and Stein (2007) note, the feedback e¤ect from FDI
and institutions could arise from two sources. First, it might be that foreign investors become
a constituency and ask for better institutions. Second, as the indicators of institutional quality
are in part based on survey data, poll respondents could give a biased judgement observing
higher levels of FDI.
24As Benassy-Quère et al. (2007) point out, an exact measure of the tax burden on corpo-
rations would be given by the so-called apparent tax rate, i.e. the ratio of tax receipts to the
generated surplus. This provides an ex-post measure of e¤ective taxation, as both variables are
in fact computed from the data. However, for the same reason, an upward bias could arise for
tax-friendly countries attracting multinational corporations. Moreover, Nicodème (2001) nds
evidence that apparent tax rates tend to move cyclically; in econometrics terms, that would
raise problems of endogeneity with FDI. Tax measures derived directly from the statutes can
be used to circumvent such problems. Ex-ante measures of e¤ective tax rates have been de-
veloped based on the provisions of the national tax codes. E¤ective, average or marginal tax
they do not take into account the denition of the tax base. In fact, as found
by Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003) for several OECD countries, the reduction in
statutory tax rates in the past years has been partially compensated by a broader
denition of taxable corporate income. Similarly, Hines (2005) nds that despite
downward pressures from international competition corporate income around the
world continues to be taxed at signicant rates. Average statutory corporate in-
come tax rates fell from 46 percent in 1982 to 33 percent in 1999, though tax bases
simultaneously broadened; as a result average corporate tax collections actually
rose from 2.1 percent of GDP in 1982 to 2.4 percent of GDP in 1999.
As an alternative tax variable, we include the e¤ective tax rates (ETRs) drawn
from the Doing Business Project of the World Bank (see Djankov et al., 2008).
These measures are derived from a newly constructed database based on a sur-
vey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on the
same standardized mid-size domestic rm (called TaxpayerCo). The principal
corporate income tax measure is the e¤ective tax rate that TaxpayerCo pays if it
complies with its countrys laws, dened as the actual corporate income tax owed
by the company relative to pre-tax prots. The reference year is 2004. Since it
is assumed that TaxpayerCo is a new company, both the e¤ective tax rate at the
end of the 1st year, and the tax rate applicable in the 5th year of activity - which
takes into account the present value of depreciation and other deductions - are
available. Hence, by construction, these tax rates circumvent the problems aris-
ing from di¤erent denitions of the tax base across countries. Hence, they o¤er a
measure of the scal burden which is immediately comparable in the cross-section.
One could question the use of domestic tax rates to model the incentives faced
by multinational investors. Although foreign rms in some countries receive tax
holidays, those tend to be relatively short term, however, and the rates that apply
to domestic rms are hence highly correlated with those on foreign ones.
Figure 1 depicts average tax rates for high and low quality countries, the for-
mer being dened as those with institutional quality in the top three deciles of the
distribution for this indicator (see previous section). Taken at face value, it shows
that e¤ective tax rates can be markedly lower than statutory rates. More interest-
rates, calculated in a series of papers following King and Hines (1984), are often used as better
suited to reect the incentives for mobile rms to react to the scal variable. Their construction,
however, hinges upon a series of assumptions regarding the cost of capital, way of nancing the
a¢ liates, etc. Moreover, According to Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002) discrete choice
decisions on location are inuenced by statutory tax rates or average e¤ective tax rates, whereas
incremental investment should react to the marginal e¤ective tax rate. FDI data do not allow
for disentangling between the motivation underlying the investment, however.
ingly, it provides evidence that countries with better institutions are on average
characterized by higher corporate taxes than low quality countries, whatever the
tax measure used in the comparison.
[Figure 1 around here]
4. Results
I start by estimating the basic specication of the di¤erence gravity equation 16
on the full sample of host country dyads belonging to the same regional trade
agreement. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on recipient pairs as each
dyad will be associated with a plurality of investors (Wooldridge, 2001). The
results are shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 around here]
A rst important check concerns the size of the coe¢ cients. All standard
gravity estimates are reasonably similar to what is usually found in the literature.
We take this as a reassuring indication as to the validity of the rst di¤erence
methodology employed.
Turning to the variables of interest, the coe¢ cients on institutional quality
have the expected positive sign and are highly signicant (at 1% condence level),
with the point estimates fairly stable across the di¤erent specications. Better
institutions are associated with a higher relative stock of inward productive capi-
tal. The numerical e¤ect is overall remarkably large. Holding all the other factors
constant, the estimates suggest that an increase equivalent to one grade in the
institutional quality indicator (measured in the original scale) is associated with a
stock of FDI around 60% larger25. Also the tax di¤erential has a statistically sig-
nicant negative impact on FDI. The estimates imply that a 10 percent increase
in the tax di¤erential is associated to an increase in the stock of inward foreign
investment by about 35% on average, all else equal. Table 2 reports additional
specications showing that the institutional quality variable is not capturing the
e¤ect of other omitted controls often introduced in the gravity literature. In par-
ticular, we check the explanatory power of GDP per capita and human capital.
25From equation 16 one can derive the percentage change in FDI as exp (2 (Ij   Im))  1,
where  indicates the change in the relevant variable. From that, the estimated proportional
change in the stock of FDI can be obtained by noting that a change of one grade corresponds
to 0.20 in the rescaled institutional quality variable.
When introduced alone, GDP per capita enters the regression with a positive and
borderline insignicant coe¢ cient. By including simultaneously the institutional
quality variable the coe¢ cient is driven into negative range, and becomes signi-
cantly di¤erent from zero. Econometrically, this result is evidently an e¤ect of the
high correlation between GDP per capita and institutional quality (around 0.88).
Institutional quality, on the other hand, retains signicant explanatory power in
the augmented regression26. Similarly, schooling is not a signicant determinant
of relative FDI stocks when included in isolation, whereas it turns signicantly
di¤erent from zero and with a negative sign in the case of joint inclusion of in-
stitutional quality. A nal check concerns the role of physical public goods. If
there are complementarities between public and private capital, the former can
be considered an additional omitted factor of production a¤ecting the produc-
tive opportunities of an economy. We use the percentage of paved roads on toal
roads as a proxy for public infrastructures. The variable enters the estimating
equation with a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient, which remains
una¤ected by the inclusion of the institutional quality variable. Overall, we take
those ndings as supporting the baseline specication.
[Table 2 around here]
In the next step, equation 17 augmented with the (demeaned) interaction
term is estimated on the three sub-samples of host country dyads. The results
are reported in Table 3. In the low quality sub-sample (left hand side panel), the
coe¢ cient on the institutional quality variable is estimated, always very precisely,
around 2.4 on average. The estimated semi-elasticity with respect to di¤erences
in corporate taxation ranges from about -3, when the e¤ective rate after 5 years
is used, to -2.3. The interaction term has the expected positive sign, and is of
sizeable magnitude in the specication with the e¤ective tax rates. It is however
not estimated with precision.
[Table 3 around here]
Turning to the high quality sub-sample, signicant di¤erences emerge with
respect to the estimated e¤ects of both variables of interest. The coe¢ cient on
institutional quality, which in the presence of the interaction term measures the
26The point estimate increases substantially in magnitude as a consequence of multicollinear-
ity.
e¤ect of institutional di¤erences at the average level of di¤erences in taxes, is
insignicantly di¤erent from zero. The lack of precision in the estimates is far
from surprising. The variable is built as bilateral di¤erences among the top 19
countries ranked based on the quality of their institutions. As such, it shows a
rather low variability. In fact, the standard deviation is around 0.050, almost
three times smaller than the standard deviation in the low quality subsample.
Both measures of the e¤ective tax burden turn insignicant in explaining relative
FDI stocks, which would lend support to the contention that FDI to high quality
countries is relatively insensitive to the scal cost. The semi-elasticity with respect
to the statutory tax rate is however strongly signicant, and twice as large as the
coe¢ cient estimates in the low quality sub-sample. This result can be reconciled
with the theory looking at the cross-term, which is positive and around three times
as large as the tax coe¢ cient in absolute value. Although its t-statistics is not
signicant, the joint signicance of both the tax coe¢ cients cannot be rejected at
1 per cent level. The F-test of the joint hypothesis is F( 2, 69) = 5.08, with an
associated p-value of 0.0087. Hence, the marginal e¤ect of the statutory tax rate
depends on the di¤erences in institutional quality.
Finally, the right hand side panel reports the estimates on the asymmetric
sub-sample. The direct e¤ects of both taxation and institutional quality di¤er-
ences are estimated with high precision. The cross-term is always positive and, in
the case of e¤ective tax rates, around two standard deviations above zero. The
F test for the joint signicance of the taxation coe¢ cients is highly signicant
in all three specications. Overall, higher corporate taxes are associated with
lower relative FDI. This relationship, however, is signicantly inuenced by the
di¤erence in institutional quality, even after controlling for the direct e¤ect of
this latter variable. Specically, the estimates using the e¤ective tax rate after 1
year suggest that at the average di¤erence in institutional quality a one percent
higher tax di¤erential decreases FDI stocks by 3.2 percentage points. Figure 2 de-
picts the total coe¢ cient on the tax rate across di¤erent values of the (demeaned)
institutional quality di¤erence, together with 95% condence bands. As can be
seen in the top panel, the estimates imply that the tax rate has a negative e¤ect
on FDI stocks for all the values of the institutional quality index up to around
1.4 standard deviations above zero27. This range covers almost 90 percent of the
sub-sample observations. For the remaining observations the e¤ect of the scal
27Here we refer to the demeaned di¤erence in the institutional quality variable as the "insti-
tutional quality index", measured along the horizontal axis in the gure. By construction, it
has zero mean.
variable even turns positive, although statistically insignicant. Overall, the tax
rate acts as a signicant deterrent to foreign investment for 65 percent of the
observed bilateral stock holdings in the sub-sample, namely those for which the
institution quality index is below 0.025. The bottom panel in Figure 2 plots the
total e¤ect of the e¤ective tax rate after 5 years. The estimated semi-elasticity at
the average di¤erence in institutional quality is equal to -6.8. To get a quantita-
tive grasp of the dampening e¤ect of better governance on the sensitivity of FDI
to the scal variable it is useful to examine di¤erent points along the distribution
of the institutional quality index. Consider, as an example, the value of -0.0726,
which corresponds to the 25th percentile. At this point, the estimated marginal
e¤ect of the tax rate is approximately equal to -8.3 percentage points. At the
75th percentile (coincident with the value of 0.0795), a one percent increase in
the tax rate reduces FDI stocks only by 5 percentage points. The e¤ect is also
statistically signicant. In other words, moving from a pair of destination coun-
tries that are very di¤erent in terms of institutional quality (in the top quartile
of the distribution) to a dyad of recipients that are rather similar (in the bottom
quartile) increases the tax sensitivity of FDI stocks by approximately 60 percent.
Overall, the negative e¤ect of the tax rate is statistically signicant for 85 percent
of the observations in the sub-sample, up to a value of the institutional quality
index equal to 0.125. At such point the estimated marginal e¤ect is -4.2, roughly
half as large as the value at the 25th percentile.
[Figure 2 around here]
As discussed previously, estimating a gravity equation in rst di¤erence has
the advantage of eliminating multilateral factors which are very hard to control
for adequately, raising the concern of an omitted variable bias in the estimates
from the standard bilateral equation in the levels. The cost of this strategy is
that not all the investors have positive FDI stocks in the same country pairs,
while the variables of interests vary indeed at the country pairs level. To check
the robustness of the bilateral results, we also estimate the di¤erence gravity with
aggregate stocks, pooling FDI originating from all the 17 investors. As noted
by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2008), the drawback of this strategy is however
that the control group in not as clearly dened as before, as investor-specic
variables drop out of the estimating equation. The results for the whole sample
are presented in Table 4.
[Table 4 around here]
Compared to the bilateral specication, coe¢ cient estimates for institutional
quality are fairly stable, whereas the tax semi-elasticities show some variation.
Specically, the point estimate for the statutory measure is remarkably smaller
(in absolute value) than in the bilateral equation, while the opposite occurs to
the e¤ective rate after 1 year. This pattern is conrmed when looking at the
asymmetric sub-sample (Table 5). Moreover, in the low quality case, the semi-
elasticity of the statutory tax rate is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Overall,
the e¤ect of taxation on FDI is still signicantly inuenced by institutional quality,
with the stronger indirect e¤ect being found not surprisingly among asymmetric
receiving country pairs. Figure 3 plot the total e¤ect of the e¤ective tax rates
across di¤erent levels of the institutional quality variable, together with the 95%
condence intervals. Inspection of the two panels gives results that are fairly
comparable to the bilateral equations.
[Table 5 around here]
[Figure 3 around here]
4.1. Sensitivity analysis
A major concern regarding the previous results is that they might be driven by
the substantial variability between developed and developing countries. This is
particularly relevant for the asymmetric subsample. To address this issue, in this
section I perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to alternative samples and
the removal of inuential observations. Table 6 reports the coe¢ cient estimates
for tax and the interaction term with institutional quality. In the upper panel I
restrict the asymmetric subsample to country pairs belonging to the same income
group according to the World Bank denition28. This dramatically reduces the
number of observations, now roughly halved with respect to the baseline estima-
tion. Nevertheless, the results still point to a strong and signicant inuence of
institutional quality on the e¤ect of taxation on FDI.
[Table 6 around here]
Next, I check whether the baseline results are driven by inuential observa-
tions. Rather than resorting to graphical inspection of the residuals, I adopt a
28Based on their income per capita, countries are classied in the following categories: Low-
income, below $825; lower-middle income, $825-$3,255; upper-middle income, $3,255-$10,065;
high income, above $10,065.
more systematic approach to outliers detection. Specically, I use the Cooks
and Welsch distances (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). Those are destructive
regression diagnostics that judge unusually inuential observations according to
di¤erent thresholds. In particular, the threshold dened by the Cooks distance
is 4=N , where N is the number of observations in the original regression. The
decision rule of the Welsch distance is 3
p
K, where K is the number of estimated
parameters in the estimating equation. The lower panels report the relevant coef-
cient estimates obtained from the subsamples after removal of such observations.
As shown, overall, the results remain robust to these sensitivity checks.
4.2. Endogeneity and measurement error
There are several issues to be discussed that suggest the use of extreme caution in
the causal interpretation of the regression coe¢ cients in the previous sections. Let
us consider rst institutional quality. As already anticipated, a major concern is
reverse causation running from FDI to institutional quality. This can arise for two
main reasons. First, foreign investors might exert pressures (directly or via their
governments) to implement institutional reforms in host countries. Secondly, as
the indicators of institutional quality are partly based on survey data, observing
high foreign investment might lead poll respondents to give a biased judgement on
the quality of the institutional infrastructure. A further problem is that institu-
tional quality can capture the e¤ect of other omitted variables that are relevant in
attracting FDI29. Finally, a third important concern is measurement error. Since it
is impossible to summarize in a single variable all dimensions of the institutional
environment, institutional quality is likely measured with noise, which in turn
would result in inconsistent and biased OLS estimates. Given these possibilities,
the OLS estimates might be bised either upwards or downwards. In particular, in
the presence of reverse causality the previous estimates will be inated, while if
measurement error dominates then the estimates will be attenuated30. A further
complication is that assuming measurement error has consequences on the den-
ition of the threshold used to split the sample of receiving country pairs on the
29For instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) nd that cultural aspects such as bilateral
trust have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the cross-border investment among European
countries.
30In the previous sections those possible problems have been tackled using a three-period av-
erage of the institutional quality measure, lagged with respect to the dependent variable. Given
the sluggish nature of FDI stocks, this strategy might prove insu¢ cient to restore consistency
and unbiasedness of the OLS estimates, however.
basis of their levels of institutional quality.
For the very same reasons discussed above, one cannot rule out a feedback
e¤ect from FDI to taxation either. Particularly in capital-importing countries, the
level of the scal burden on corporations might be inuenced, directly or indirectly,
by the lobbying e¤orts of foreign investors. Similarly, investment decisions might
be taken in anticipation of future lower taxes in the destination country. Again,
the direction of the bias in the OLS estimates is uncertain. In the rst scenario,
they will be biased upwards, whereas the second scenario will result in a downward
bias. All in all, the previous discussion shows that treating both the variables of
interest - institutional quality and tax rates - as exogenous is not without problems,
also in the light of the theoretical model where they are jointly determined. In
this section we try to circumvent those caveats by using instrumental variables
techniques to obtain exogenous variation in both institutional performance and
tax rates.
In choosing the set of instruments, we follow a well-established literature and
consider a countrys legal origin as an exogenous determinant of current institu-
tional performance31. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) show that legal systems di¤er
systematically for their e¤ect on investors protection, court e¢ ciency and legal
formalism. In particular, they nd that English common law countries turn out on
average superior when it comes to protection of shareholders and creditor rights,
whereas French civil law countries o¤er the weakest legal protection and the worst
legal enforcement. In addition, legal systems originated in the Socialist and in the
French tradition exhibit the worse performance in terms of public sector e¢ ciency
and bureaucratic quality32. Since our unit of observation is a country pair, we
31Recently, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have isolated a large, precisely estimated, and
robust e¤ect on several measures of contracting institutions. Property rights institutions, on the
other hand, would be mainly inuenced by the colonization strategy adopted by the Europeans.
In fact, in a seminal paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) propose to use European
settler mortality in the colonies as an instrument for institutional quality, which is regarded as
having long term persistence. The underlying hypothesis is that extractive institutions were set
up in countries plagued with higher mortality. By construction, this variable is available only
for colonized countries. For this reason, coupled with the fact that having country pairs as the
unit of analysis results in even fewer observations, we cannot use such variable as an instrument
for institutional quality. Moreover, the results in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson have been
recently challenged on the grounds of the hypotheses used in the construction of the mortality
variable (Albouy, 2010).
32There is still debate in the literature on the exct mechanisms through which legal origin
a¤ects institutions, whether through political institutions, legal e¢ ciency or regulatory practices.
Since we are using a composite measure of institutional quality, the fact that there can be
dene the instrument as the di¤erence between two dummies that take the value
of one in case of English legal origin.
Recent results from the economic theory can provide useful indications as
to nding sources of exogenous varation for tax rates. We follow Da Rin, Di
Giacomo and Sembenelli (2010) in underpinning our choice of instruments with
the political economy literature on the e¤ects of polical variables on scal policy
outcomes (see, for instance, Persson and Tabellini, 2004 on constitutional forms;
Castanheira, Nicodème and Profeta, 2010 on the implementation of tax reforms).
In partucular, we add to the list of excluded instruments: a variable capturing the
(di¤erences in the) margin of majority, dened as the fraction of seats held by the
government; a (di¤erence) dummy variable for right-wing ideological orientation
of the main government party; a (di¤erence) dummy variable for the presence of
a constitutional limit to the number of years the executive can serve. Instruments
are drawn from the Political Institutions Database of theWorld Bank. Preliminary
inspection of the rst stage regressions for tax rates and institutions shows that
legal origin has a strong e¤ect on institutional quality and little e¤ect on tax
rates, whereas political variables have a large e¤ect on tax rates, and impact the
measure of institutional quality mainly insignicantly. As the interaction term
between taxes and institutional quality in equation 17 is e¤ectively endogenous
as well, the set of instruments includes also interactions between the dummy for
English legal origin and the political variables.
[Table 7 around here]
The instrumental variable analysis is performed using the generalized method
of moments estimator (GMM-IV), which allows for heteroscedasticity of unknown
forms. The results are reported in table 7. Panel A shows that both institutional
quality and taxation retain their e¤ect on FDI, and the size of their coe¢ cients
increases roughly twofold with respect to the estimates in table 1. The interaction
term is positive and statistically signicant in all the three specications with
statutory and e¤ective tax rates. The rst stage regressions, reported in Panel B,
show that the instruments are indeed strongly related to the endogenous variables.
To address formally the issue of potential weak correlation - which would result
in biased IV estimates and misleading standard errors - the F statistics proposed
by Angrist and Pischke (2009) is computed and reported among the diagnostics
in Panel C. This test can be used to test the weak identication of individual
di¤erent channels is not a big concern.
regressors in the presence of multiple endogenous variables. It is constructed by
partialling-out linear projections of the remaining endogenous regressors. This
test statistic can be compared to the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo
(2005). In all cases, the values of the test are above the threshhold recommended
by these authors. Instrument validity is assessed using the Hansen J statistics for
over-identifying restrictions. The p-values associated with the statistics suggest
that the null hypothesis of instrument validity cannot be rejected.
5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the joint e¤ect of taxes and institutional quality on the al-
location of international investment. Modelling institutional quality as a public
good in a two-country framework, it is shown that the jurisdiction providing better
institutions is able to levy a higher tax on capital and to attract more productive
investment compared to the low-quality/low-tax location, provided rmsprots
are su¢ ciently responsive to the institutional quality variable. This suggests that
there might be signicant di¤erences in the sensitivity of FDI to the scal variable
between countries characterized by di¤erent levels of institutional quality.
This contention has been taken to the data using FDI stocks to 63 economies.
The results from a di¤erence gravity equation point to a signicant responsiveness
of FDI stocks to taxation in countries with low quality institutions. On the other
hand, e¤ective tax rates do not seem to be a determinant of investment directed
to high quality economies. Moreover, it is found that the scal variable plays a
major role in the allocation of investment between countries with di¤erent levels
of institutional quality, although the overall e¤ect of taxation depends on the
di¤erences in institutional quality.
In summary, high taxes do not seem to be a deterrent to investing into ad-
vanced economies as commonly feared, while at the same time a low scal burden
on corporations might prove insu¢ cient to attract productive capital in the ab-
sence of market-supporting institutions. These ndings may create an important
distinction to be made in estimating empirical relationships and drawing policy
inferences. In order to do so, however, further investigations are necessary within
an extended modelling framework to take into account all the other factors - like
prot shifting and the design of national taxation policies towards cross-border
prots - that concur in determing the actual scal burden on multinational cor-
porations.
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Appendix
A. Extension: scal competition in the presence of agglom-
eration economies
Agglomeration economies have been recognized as an important driving factor for
rmslocation decisions. A recent theoretical literature has studied the implica-
tions for strategis tax setting among jurisdictions competing for mobile produc-
tive capital. Models of the "new economic geography" models, in particular, can
accommodate situations in which, in contrast to the standard tax competition
literature, a "race to top" in corporate taxes emerges. In a "core-periphery" con-
guration in which the industry is concentrated in one location, an agglomeration
rent accrues to investment in the core region. Hence, the core jurisdiction can in
principle tax away part of such rent without inducing outows of capital (Borck
and Püger, 2006). On the other hand, in an alternative setting, agglomeration
externalities can increase the sensitivity of capital to tax di¤erentials. When a
rms location decision can trigger further inows of capital, governments might
be forced to reduce the scal burden to maintain their attarctiveness for corpora-
tions (Konrad and Kovenock, 2009). In this section we propose a simple extension
to the baseline model to study the e¤ects of agglomeration externalities on the
scal competition outcome.
Following Brülhart et al. (2008), agglomeration economies can be modelled in
a simple way by explicitly including an agglomeration rent in the prot function.
From equation 1 prots to rm i locating in country j are as follows:
ij = p  w    j + aj + X^j + "ij (18)
In 18, X^j is the measure of rms locating in j, whereas  > 0 is a parameter
capturing the strenght of agglomeration economies. All the other terms are the
same as before, with "ij, in particular, i.i.d. and distributed according to the
double exponential. The probability of choosing country 1, given X^1 and X^2, is:
s1 =
exp
h
a1    1 + X^1

=
i
exp
h
a1    1 + X^1

=
i
+ exp
h
a2    2 + X^2

=
i (19)
Hence, the number of rms locating in each country will be given by the solution
to the system of two equations:
X^i = Nsi i = 1; 2:
Rearranging 19, and using the equality X^1 + X^2 = N , one gets the following
(implicit) expression for the number of rms in country 1:
X^1 = N
h
1 + exp

 1    2 + a2   a1 + 

N   2X^1

=
i 1
. (20)
It is possible to show that 20 has a unique solution for X^1 if  < 2=N 33. In-
tuitively, the e¤ect of the agglomeration economies on prots does not have to
be too strong; otherwise, taxes and institutional quality do not provide enough
incentives to drive a rms location decision, given the relevance of other rms
choices. In this case, multiple allocations of rms across the two jurisdictions for
a given level of quality and taxes would be possible.
Following equation 4 in the text, government revenues net of the costs of
institutional quality for country 1 are:
R^1 = ( 1   a1) X^1   C (a1)
Maximization with respect to the tax rate gives the rst order condition as:
@R^1
@ 1
= X^1 + ( 1   a1) @X^1
@ 1
= (21)
= X^j   ( 1   a1) X^1 (1  s1) [ N2s1 (1  s1)] 1 = 0,
where the second line uses the fact that @X^1=@ 1 =  X^1 (1  s1) [ N2s1 (1  s1)] 1
by virtue of the rule for derivatives of implicit functions34. Rearranging the FOC
in 21 gives:
33To see that the equation X^1 = Ns1

X^1

has a unique solution, one can derive the follow-
ing properties from 19: i) s1 (0) > 0; ii) s1 (N) < 1 and iii) ds1=dX^1 = 2s1 (1  s1) 1.
As s1 (1  s1)  1=4, it follows that ds1=dX^1  =2: Thus, if  < 2N it holds that
d (Ns1) =dX^1 < 1. The latter inequality together with properties i) and ii) shows that
X^1 = Ns1

X^1

has a unique solution.
34Given the implicit function F

X^1; 1

 X^1  	1

X^1; 1

= 0, where 	1

X^1; 1

is the
right hand side of 20, the following di¤erentiation rule holds: @X^1=@1 =  @F=@1=@F=@X^1.
 aggl1 =

(1  s1) + a1  N2s1 (22)
Imposing symmetry, the implicit solution becomes35:
 aggl = 2+ a N: (23)
It is easy to check that, given the level of institutional quality, the tax rate in 23
is lower than the corresponding symmetric tax rate in the case without agglom-
eration economies. Moreover, such tax rate decreases monotonically with both
the agglomeration parameter and the total measure of rms, @ aggl=@ < 0 and
@ aggl=@N < 0. Hence, the fact that rms benet from the externalities from
other producers exacerbates tax competition between the two jurisdictions.
Straightforward comparative statics can be derived to examine how changes
in institutional quality a¤ect equilibrium taxes in the presence of agglomeration
economies. The full expressions are reported in the Appendix D, where it can be
easily veried that, not surprisingly, d aggl1 =da1 > 0 and d
aggl
2 =da1 < 0 ,  > .
More interesting is the comparison of the magnitude of such e¤ects with respect
to the case without agglomeration economies. From 29 and 30 in Appendix D it
can be easily seen that:
sign
"
d 1
da1
  d
aggl
1
da1
#
= sign [   ] ,
and
sign
"
d 2
da1
  d
aggl
2
da1
#
=  sign [   ] .
The size of the variable cost parameter  relative to , which measure the sensi-
tivity of the prot function to institutional quality, is crucial in determining the
relative size of the di¤erentials. In particular, if  > , in the presence of agglom-
eration economies tax rates are more responsive to institutional quality compared
to the baseline scenario. Hence, in equilibrium, the high quality country can levy
a correspondingly higher tax on capital, whereas the competing jurisdiction has
to decrease substantially the scal burden to be still able to attract investment.
35By using the result in Proposition 7.5 in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), the existence
of a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed if  < 1:6875=N:
On the other hand, when  < , the rise in taxes for country 1 is dampened in
the case with agglomeration economies because corporate prots are scarcely re-
sponsive to institutional quality. For the same reason, the low quality jurisdiction
can impose a more pronounced tax increase.
B. Extension: subsidizing institutional quality
The analysis in section 2 shows that the level of xed cost of institutional quality
is crucial for the equilibrium outcome of the game. In particular, high quality
institutions can be implemented by the developed country only if the incremental
xed cost with respect to the low quality alternative is not excessively high. The
lagging jurisdiction, on the other hand, can achieve high quality institutions for a
more restrictive range of such xed costs. This would motivate a policy interven-
tion aimed at subsidizing institution building. In fact, international organizations
such as the World Bank provide various forms of aid to developing countries in
this eld, including direct nancing. Similarly, nancial assistance to adequate
the national regulatory and institutional frameworks to the required standards is
envisaged in the accession process to the European Union.
An easy way to include subsidization to promote institution building in the
model is having the leading country paying a fraction of the xed cost of institu-
tional quality incurred by the laggard. Rents to the two governments are now:
R1 = ( 1   a1)X1   C (a1)  C (a2)
R2 = ( 2   a2)X2   (1  )C (a2) (24)
where  is part of xed cost subsidized by the developed country.
It is easy to see that the tax competition sub-game in the third stage is not
a¤ected in this new arrangement. Hence, the implicit equilibrium tax rate is still
given by the expression in 5. The sequential sub-game in quality can be solved
as usual starting from the problem of the lagging country. The sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium of the full game is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The SPNE of the game with subsidized institutional quality is
as follows:
 for C (a) <   1  1


N , both countries provide high quality ("race to the
top");
 for   1  1


N < C (a) < 
 
1  1


N(1   ) 1, there is quality di¤er-
entiation with the lagging country setting a high quality ("second mover
advantage");
 for   1  1


N(1  ) 1 < C (a) <  (   1)N(1  ) 1, there is quality
di¤erentiation with the leading country setting a high quality ("rst mover
advantage");
 for C (a) >  (   1)N(1 ) 1, both countries provide low quality ("race
to the bottom").
Several comments are in order. First, introducing a subsidizing scheme from
the developed to the developing country has no e¤ects on the symmetric high
quality equilibrium. The cost range in which such equilibrium can be sustained
is indeed the same as in the game with no subsidization. Second, ceteris paribus,
the scope for a "race to the bottom" is reduced; the cost range that gives rise to
a low equilibrium is smaller than in the baseline case. Finally, some interesting
conclusions can be drawn for the case of asymmetric equilibria. Overall, there
is a larger scope for sustaining such equilibria. The cost range in which there
is a rst mover advantage shifts to the right, i.e. it can be sustained at higher
costs compared to the baseline case. Moreover, the possibility of a second mover
advantage arises, with the lagging country setting high quality institutions and the
leading country choosing instead low quality. The rationale is easily understood by
recalling that the developed country is now nancing part of the xed cost incurred
by the competitor. When the xed incremental cost decrease to 
 
1  1


N(1 
) 1, the developing country nds it protable to set high institutional quality
in response to the high quality chosen by the leader. This latter, however, would
be facing an excessive additional cost for high quality. Hence, it will switch to
providing low quality in its own jurisdiction, leaving the other with higher taxes
and a higher fraction of investing rms.
C. Total di¤erential of equilibrium taxes
The total di¤erential of the rst order conditions of the tax sub-games can be found
as follows. First, note that the derivative properties: @Xi
@ i
=   1

Xi (1  si) < 0;
@Xi
@ j
= 1

Xisj > 0, @Xi@ai =
1

Xisj > 0. The implicit solution for the tax rate of
country 1 is:
G1 =  1   
(1  s1)   a1 = 0
The total di¤erential is G11d 1 + G
1
2
d 2 + G
1
a1
da1 = 0. Recalling the denition
1  X1=X2, it is easy to show that
G11 = 1 

(1  s1)2
@s1
@ 1
= 1 + 1
Moreover, G12 =  1 and G1a1 =   (1 + ). Substituting in the total di¤erential
gives:
(1 + 1) d 1   1d 2   (1 + ) da1 = 0 (25)
Mutatis mutandis, the total di¤erential of the implicit equilibrium tax rate for
country 2 is G21d 1+G
2
2
d 2+G
2
a1
da1 = 0: It can easily shown that the following
conditions hold: G21 =   (1=1), G22 = (1 + 1=1) and G2a1 = 1=1: Substitution
in the total di¤erential gives:
  1
1
d 1 +

1 +
1
1

d 2 +
1
1
da1 = 0 (26)
Finally, combining 25 and 26 gives the expressions 6 and 7 in the text.
D. Total di¤erential of equilibrium taxes with agglomera-
tion economies
The total di¤erential of equilibrium taxes is found as follows. As before, it is
useful to derive rst the derivative properties: @si
@ i
=   1

si (1  si)Z 1 < 0; @si@ j =
1

sisjZ
 1 > 0, @si
@ai
= 1

sisjZ
 1 > 0, with Z  [  2Nsi (1  si)]. Given the
restriction on the value of  required for a unique solution to si, it is easy to check
that Z > 0. The implicit solution for the tax rate of country 1 is:
G1 =  1   
(1  s1)   a1 + 2Ns1 = 0
The total di¤erential is therefore G11d 1 + G
1
2
d 2 + G
1
a1
da1 = 0. Recalling that
1  X1=X2 = s1=s2, and dening '1  s1 (1  s1), it is easy to show that:
G11 = 1  1Z 1 + 2N'1Z 1,
G12 =  1Z 1   2N'1Z 1,
and
G1a1 =  1Z 1      2N'1Z 1:
Mutatis mutandis, the total di¤erential of the implicit equilibrium tax rate for
country 2 is G21d 1+G
2
2
d 2+G
2
a1
da1 = 0: It can easily shown that the following
conditions hold:
G21 =   (1Z) 1   2N'1Z 1;
G22 = 1 +  (1Z)
 1 + 2N'1Z
 1
and
G2a1 =  (1Z)
 1 + 2N'1Z
 1:
After substitution in the relevant total di¤erentials, tedious but straightforward
algebraic manipulations give the following comparative statics expressions:
d aggl1
da1
=
 (1 + 1) + 
2
1 + 2N1'1
 (1 + 1 + 21) + 2N1'1
; (27)
and
d aggl2
da1
=
(   ) (+ 2N1'1)
 (1 + 1 + 21) + 2N1'1
: (28)
By comparing these di¤erential with those derived in the baseline model without
agglomeration economies (see equations 6 and 7 in the text) one gets:
d 1
da1
  d
aggl
1
da1
= (   ) 
 (29)
d 2
da1
  d
aggl
2
da1
=   (   ) 
 (30)
where 
  2 (1 + 1)N1'1 [( (1 + 1 + 21) + 2N1'1) (1 + 21 + 1)] 1 > 0.
E. Data appendix
Table E-1: Countries Coverage
European Union and Associated Countries
Austria (i) Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus
Czech Republic Denmark (i) Finland (i) France (i) Germany (i)
Estonia Greece Hungary Ireland Italy (i)
Latvia Lithuania Malta Netherlands (i) Poland
Portugal (i) Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain (i)
Sweden United Kingdom (i)
Andean Community ASEAN (plus Three) MERCOSUR
Bolivia Indonesia Philippines Argentina
Ecuador Singapore Thailand Brazil
Peru Japan (i) China Uruguay
Venezuela Malaysia Hong Kong
CER EFTA SAFTA
Australia (i) Norway* (i) India
New Zealand Switzerland (i) Republic of Korea (i)
CIS Euro-Med NAFTA
Armenia Egypt Morocco Canada (i)
Georgia Jordan Tunisia Mexico
Kyrgyzstan Israel United States (i)
Russia Lebanon
Ukraine Turkey
Notes: (i) denotes that the country is observed also as an investor.
* Norway is also considered part of the EU and Associated countries as a member of the European Economic Area.
Table E-2: Variables and data sources
Variables Description
FDI Stock of outward FDI 2003-2005 (mio USD). Source: OECD -
International Direct Investment Database.
GDP Gross Domestic Product 2003-2005 (mio USD). Source: World
Bank - World Development Indicators.
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product 2003-2005 (USD). Source: World Bank
- World Development Indicators.
Distance Greater circle distance between economic centers in investor-
recipient country pairs. Source: CEPII (www.cepii.fr).
Colony Dummy equal to one for investor-recipient country pairs linked by
colonial ties. Source: CEPII (www.cepii.fr).
Language Dummy equal to one for investor-recipient country pairs sharing
a common language. Source: CEPII (www.cepii.fr).
School Average years of schooling for population aged 25 and over.
Source: Barro and Lee, 2000.
Roads Percentage of paved roads in 2003. Source: World Bank - World
Development Indicators.
Institutional quality Simple average of Government e¤ectiveness and Rule of law in-
dicators. Average of biannual data for the 1996-2000 period.
Rescaled on 0-1 using (Index+2.5)/5. Source: Kaufmann et al.,
2008.
English legal origin Dummy for English legal origin. Source: La Porta et al., 1999.
Margin of majority Fraction of seats held by the government. Source: World Bank -
Political Institutions Database.
Right-wing orientation Dummy for right-wing ideological orientation of the main govern-
ment party. Source: World Bank - Political Institutions Database.
Limits to term Dummy for the presence of a constitutional limit to the number
of years the executive can serve. Source: World Bank - Political
Institutions Database.
Measures of Corporate Taxation
Statutory tax rate Statutory corporate tax rate (highest income bracket) in 2004.
Sources: OECD Tax Database; Djankov et al., 2008.
1st year E¤ective tax rate Total corporate tax divided by pretax earnings of a standard-
ized enterprise at the end of the 1st year of operations. Source:
Djankov et al., 2008.
5th year E¤ective tax rate Present-discounted value of the total corporate tax over ve years
divided by the present-discounted value of the pretax earnings of
a standardized enterprise. Source: Djankov et al., 2008.
Table E-3: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard
Devia-
tion
# of
country
pairs
ln(FDI) 1.166 3.152 452
Institutional quality 0.114 0.165 452
Statutory tax rate 0.037 0.102 452
E¤ective tax rate (Y1) 0.034 0.085 452
E¤ective tax rate (Y5) 0.034 0.072 452
ln(GDP) 0.968 2.171 452
Notes: All variables are in rst di¤erences.
Table E-4: Quantiles for Institu-
tional Quality Variable
Percentile Value
10 0.3953
20 0.4610
30 0.4894
40 0.5486
50 0.6269
60 0.6674
70 0.7469
80 0.8547
90 0.8787
Tables
Table 1: Di¤erence Gravity
(1) (2) (3)
ratio_GDP 0.985*** 0.920*** 0.941***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.038)
ratio_Distance -1.348*** -1.353*** -1.360***
(0.042) (0.054) (0.053)
Common language 0.633*** 0.549*** 0.511***
(0.100) (0.107) (0.104)
Colonial ties 1.006*** 1.019*** 1.013***
(0.099) (0.111) (0.111)
di¤_Institutions 2.303*** 2.378*** 2.668***
(0.359) (0.417) (0.410)
di¤_Tax -3.765*** -2.351*** -4.474***
(0.552) (0.870) (1.066)
Constant -0.089 -0.099 -0.081
(0.059) (0.069) (0.069)
Observations 5,184 4,389 4,389
R-squared 0.617 0.568 0.573
Notes: Dependent variable is log-di¤erence of bilateral
FDI stocks from 17 investing countries to 452 pairs of
destination countries. In column (1) the tax di¤erential
uses the statutory corporate tax rate; columns (2) and
(3) report the tax di¤erentials built with the e¤ective
tax rates after 1 year and after 5 years, respectively.
Robust standard errors clustered on host country dyads
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the
1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 2: Di¤erence Gravity - Adding Other Variables
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ratio_GDP pc 0.140** 0.125* 0.153** -0.574** -0.664*** -0.646***
(0.058) (0.071) (0.070) (0.099) (0.113) (0.110)
di¤_Institutions 5.557*** 6.122*** 6.320***
(0.627) (0.695) (0.665)
di¤_Tax -3.644*** -1.753* -3.273*** -3.789*** -3.266*** -5.078***
(0.600) (0.947) (1.157) (0.559) (0.861) (0.993)
Observations 5,184 4,389 4,389 5,184 4,389 4,389
R-squared 0.607 0.554 0.557 0.625 0.582 0.587
ratio_Yschool -0.318 -0.004 0.057 -0.807*** -0.563** -0.524**
(0.203) (0.227) (0.219) (0.187) (0.221) (0.205)
di¤_Institutions 2.768*** 2.783*** 3.080***
(0.365) (0.442) (0.433)
di¤_Tax -4.086*** -1.781* -3.081*** -4.679*** -2.786*** -4.959***
(0.653) (1.005) (1.191) (0.561) (0.895) (1.076)
Observations 5,092 4,297 4,297 5,092 4,297 4,297
R-squared 0.608 0.553 0.556 0.624 0.572 0.578
ratio_Roads -0.190** -0.515*** -0.487*** -0.274*** -0.584*** -0.569***
(0.084) (0.117) (0.119) (0.080) (0.119) (0.113)
di¤_Institutions 2.303*** 2.310*** 2.537***
(0.374) (0.473) (0.441)
di¤_Tax -4.949*** -5.447*** -7.540*** -4.801*** -5.032*** -7.634***
(0.668) (0.974) (1.214) (0.574) (0.901) (1.081)
Observations 3,036 2,423 2,423 3,036 2,423 2,423
R-squared 0.649 0.593 0.600 0.658 0.606 0.616
Notes: Dependent variable is log-di¤erence of bilateral FDI stocks. In column (1) the tax
di¤erential uses the statutory corporate tax rate; columns (2) and (3) report the tax di¤erentials
built with the e¤ective tax rates after 1 year and after 5 years, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered on host country dyads in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the
1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Aggregate Di¤erence Gravity
(1) (2) (3)
ratio_GDP 0.928*** 0.968*** 0.956***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.034)
di¤_Institutions 2.958*** 3.186*** 3.398***
(0.343) (0.349) (0.354)
di¤_Tax -1.818*** -4.645*** -5.544***
(0.695) (0.794) (0.950)
Constant -0.005 0.058 0.073
(0.063) (0.066) (0.067)
Observations 452 374 374
R-squared 0.799 0.786 0.787
Notes: Dependent variable is log-di¤erence of aggregate
FDI stocks to 452 pairs of destination countries. In col-
umn (1) the tax di¤erential uses the statutory corporate
tax rate; columns (2) and (3) report the tax di¤erentials
built with the e¤ective tax rates after 1 year and after
5 years, respectively. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis for Asymmetric Country
Pairs
Including only countries in the same income group
(1) (2) (3)
di¤_Tax -3.196*** -4.645** -8.974***
(1.105) (1.884) (2.046)
di¤_Tax*di¤_Institutions 32.88* 32.95** 18.38
(17.00) (15.17) (20.13)
F-statistics 9.76 8.92 11.13
(prob > F) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Observations 1,489 1,146 1,146
Omitting inuential observations: Cooks distance
(1) (2) (3)
di¤_Tax -4.784*** -2.768** -6.182***
(0.602) (1.126) (1.209)
di¤_Tax*di¤_Institutions 10.36* 20.08*** 16.29**
(5.616) (6.635) (7.853)
F-statistics 43.80 7.25 14.55
(prob > F) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Observations 2,295 1,950 1,945
Omitting inuential observations: Welsch distance
(1) (2) (3)
di¤_Tax -3.990*** -2.981** -6.640***
(0.844) (1.263) (1.402)
di¤_Tax*di¤_Institutions 10.10 27.16*** 23.86**
(8.591) (8.681) (11.00)
F-statistics 14.27 7.91 13.41
(prob > F) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000)
Observations 2,408 2,034 2,033
Notes: Dependent variable is log-di¤erence of bilateral FDI
stocks from 17 investing countries to 452 pairs of destination
countries. In column (1) the tax di¤erential uses the statutory
corporate tax rate; columns (2) and (3) report the tax di¤eren-
tials built with the e¤ective tax rates after 1 year and after 5
years, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,
** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respec-
tively.
Table 7: Instrumental variables
Panel A: GMM-IV estimates
(1) (2) (3)
ratio_GDP 0.952*** 0.822*** 0.787***
(0.059) (0.073) (0.069)
ratio_Distance -1.304*** -1.224*** -1.255***
(0.049) (0.066) (0.064)
Common language 0.541*** 0.376*** 0.330***
(0.116) (0.109) (0.110)
Colonial ties 0.987*** 1.003*** 1.046***
(0.107) (0.131) (0.127)
di¤_Institutions 3.970*** 6.615*** 6.996***
(0.992) (1.137) (1.074)
di¤_Tax -5.031*** -6.316*** -6.818***
(1.357) (2.264) (2.413)
di¤_Tax*di¤_Institutions 37.48* 29.80** 39.22**
(22.22) (13.91) (17.85)
Panel B: First stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
English legal origin -0.076*** -0.015** -0.009 0.132***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021)
Margin of majority 0.007 -0.177*** -0.164*** -0.049
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.062)
Right wing orientation 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.055***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
Limits to term -0.001 0.014 0.005 -0.040
(0.035) (0.016) (0.018) (0.038)
Panel C: Diagnostics
R-squared in rst stage 0.516 0.480 0.452 0.318
Angrist-Pischke F test 29.00 63.84 28.97 11.25
OID test 0.587 6.578 6.583
p-value [0.965] [0.160] [0.160]
Observations 4,807 4,041 4,041
Notes: Dependent variable is log-di¤erence of bilateral FDI stocks from 17
investing countries to 452 pairs of destination countries. In column (1) the
tax di¤erential uses the statutory corporate tax rate; columns (2) and (3)
report the tax di¤erentials built with the e¤ective tax rates after 1 year
and after 5 years, respectively. First stage regressions include interactions
between legal origin and the political variables. Column (4) contains the
rst stage regression for the institutional quality variable. The OID test is
the Hansen J-statistic (overidentication test of all instruments). Robust
standard errors clustered on host country dyads in parentheses. ***, ** and
* denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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